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Defending Substantial Assistance:
An Old Prosecutor's Meditation On Singleton, Sealed Case,
and the Maxfield-Kramer Report
In recent issues, FSR published several federal appellate opinions that, depending on one's point of view,
either promised or threatened radical changes in the
practice of rewarding with reduced punishment defendants who cooperate with the government. In July
1998, a panel of the D.C. Circuit decided In re Sealed
Case (Sentencing Guidelines "SubstantialAssistance"),'
and ruled that sentencing judges have discretion to
reduce the sentences of cooperating witnesses without
a government "substantial assistance" motion requesting the reduction. In the same month, in United States
v. Singleton,' a panel of the Tenth Circuit struck an even
more fundamental blow at current practice by holding
that the venerable custom of awarding cooperating
criminal defendants sentence reductions for truthful
testimony against others constitutes felony bribery.
Despite the hosannas from the defense bar and some
observers in the academy that greeted these two opinions, there was never much chance that either would
long survive.
This essay begins with a brief analysis of the panel
and en banc opinions in Sealed Case and Singleton, and
then turns to the more arresting question of whether the
panel decisions were transitory aberrations or something more. Particularly if one considers Singleton and
Sealed Case together with the Sentencing Commission's
staff report on substantial assistance practice (the
"Maxfield-Kramer Report"), it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that unease with the current substantial
assistance regime is growing. Unlike many observers, I
view S5KI.I as a very good thing, an invaluable prosecutorial tool against group criminality, but a tool that federal prosecutors are in danger of losing or having
blunted in part due to their own indiscipline in employing the discretion the law now bestows on them. This
essay argues that "attention must be paid" to substantial
assistance by those in authority at the Justice Department, and that if the Department fails to monitor its
own practices and practice self-restraint, others are likely
to impose restraints that will prove far less palatable.
In re Sealed Case
The Sealed Case panel tortured the plain language of
S5Ki.i, which stipulates that a court "may depart" from
the otherwise applicable guideline sentence "[u]pon
motion of the government." The panel reached the
remarkable conclusion that a district court could grant a
substantial assistance departure without a government
motion because such a departure was "unmentioned" in
the Guidelines and was thus a permissible exercise of
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sentencing discretion under the standards announced by
the Supreme Court in Koon v. United States., The judges
reasoned that substantial assistance departures in
response to a government motion are specifically sanctioned by 5K1.I, but departures for substantial assistance in the absence of such a motion are not prohibited FRANK 0.
in so many words and should therefore be considered
BOWMAN, III
"unmentioned" and permissible. The obvious weakness
in this reasoning is the language of 5 KI.I itself, which
Associate Professor of
grants judges the power to award substantial assistance
Law, Indiana University
departures "upon motion of the government." In ordiSchool of Law, Indinary English usage, when I say, "Upon the occurrence of anapolis. Formerly SpeX, you may do Y," the listener understands without furcial Counsel, U.S.
ther explanation that if X does not occur, then permisSentencing Commission to do Y is not granted. Whether a departure factor
sion (1995-96); Assisproperly falls into Koon's "unmentioned" category
tant U.S. Attorney,
depends on whether the Commission "adequately conSouthern District of
sidered" it, not on whether the Commission wrote into
Florida; Trial Attorney,
the text of the Guidelines the fact that consideration was Criminal Division, U.S.
given. The subject of\\ 5 KI.i is the departure factor of sub- Department of Justice;
stantial assistance to the government. In draffing 5K1,
and sometime criminal
the Commission plainly "considered" all cases of cooper- defense attorney.
ation, but made a "considered" distinction between cases
in which the government makes a motion and cases in
which it does not.5
In July '999, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc,
unanimously reversed the decision of the panel in In re
Sealed Case.6 The full court held that "it is clear that by
authorizing [substantial assistance] departures with
government motions, the Commission did intend to
preclude departures without motions."' The Supreme
Court's decision in Koon liberalizing the general standard for departures under the Guidelines, did not, in
the view of the en banc court, alter the plain meaning of
the language of \ 5K1.1.
U.S. v. Singleton
The Tenth Circuit's Singleton decision at least rested on
a plausible textual foundation. Title 18, U.S.C., Section
201(c)(2) says that "whoever" offers or promises "anything of value to any person, for or because of the testimony" of such person commits the crime of bribery.
The Singleton panel simply declared that "whoever"
means "whoever," and that a prosecutor who promises
to consider requesting a sentence reduction for a cooperating witness violates the statute. The flaw in the Singleton panel opinion was not in its literal reading of the
statutory text, but in its failure to credit the overwhelming extrinsic evidence that Section 201(c)(2) was never
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status quo has been restored and will think no more of
the matter. On the defense side, some observers may
despair of ever reforming a system they believe confers
unfair advantages on prosecutors and distorts principles of sentencing equity. Both complacency and
despair are, I think, unwarranted. Singleton and Sealed
Case, poorly reasoned though they may have been, were
not localized squalls of judicial irrationality, but storm
warnings of a gathering discontent with a number of
aspects of federal practice regarding bargaining for testimony. Both those who would defend the present
arrangements and those who would alter them should
be thinking carefully about the battles to come.

intended to cover bargained-for testimony by witnesses
cooperating with the government.
The practice of bargaining for testimony is of
immense antiquity9 yet the legislative history of
201(c)(2) contains no indication of an intention to

change so established a feature of the criminal court
landscape. More importantly, in numerous other
statutes, Congress has repeatedly, and expressly, sanctioned and regulated the exchange of leniency for testimony The federal witness immunity statutes passed in
197 o require courts, upon motion of the government, to
confer immunity on witnesses who testify for the government.'0 The Witness Relocation and Protection Act,"
passed in 1974, allows the government to make monetary payments to and create whole new identities for
cooperating witnesses. Most critically, the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, particularly 18 U.S.C. \ 3553(e) and
28 U.S.C. S 994(n), authorized judges to reduce sentences below statutory minimums for cooperators and
mandated that the Sentencing Commission create sentencing rules that take substantial assistance to the government into account. In response, the Sentencing
Commission drafted guidelines and policy statements,
including Section 5Ki.i on substantial assistance departures, and Congress accepted them.
In addition, in Section 205 (b) of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress itselfdirectly
amended Rule 35 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to permit reductions in sentence for cooperation within a year after the original sentencing date to
the same extent that such reductions would be available
at the time of sentencing under the Guidelines." Thus,
Congress itself adopted by reference the standards for
sentence reduction in S 5KI., including the requirement of truthful, complete, and reliable testimony. The
premise on which the Singleton panel opinion rested that Congress intended to criminalize under Section
201(c) (2) the very same conduct it expressly authorized
elsewhere - was never tenable.
On January 8, 1999, the en banc Tenth Circuit
reversed Singleton, holding that 5 201(c)(2) does not
extend to prosecutors who bargain for testimony." The
majority opinion took a narrowly semantic approach,
reasoning that the word "whoever" in S 2oi refers only
to natural persons and thus cannot cover a prosecutor
negotiating a substantial assistance agreement because,
when doing so, she is the "alter ego" of the government
itself The court also noted the irreconcilable conflict
between the panel's reading of 201(c)(2) and the many
statutes expressly sanctioning bargaining for testimony.

Singleton: The Fear of Too Many Snitches
The Singleton decision raises the most fundamental questions about the substantial assistance regime. The judges
who found bargaining for testimony to be a felony were
plainly motivated by more than a sudden infatuation
with textual literalism. The panel opinion repeatedly
expressed the concern that the practice of rewarding
felons for testimony perverts justice and creates a risk of
"fraud upon the federal courts in the form of inherently
unreliable testimony" Even in the face of franldy overwhelming evidence of Congressional intent to sanction
such bargains, the panel professed itself unconvinced by
the conventional law enforcement justification that bargaining for testimony is necessary to the successful prosecution of certain classes of crime.'5
Although the original panel was plainly wrong in
stubbornly refusing to accept the unmistakable legislative mandate for "buying" testimony, its opinion
nonetheless forces us to confront realities of the substantial assistance regime that a decade of habituation
have tended to obscure. Substantial assistance motions
have become so entrenched a feature of federal practice- such a valued tool of prosecutors and such a cherished escape hatch for defendants facing long
sentences -that one easily forgets the true nature of the
transactions these motions reflect. Properly considered,
bargaining for testimony with convicted felons is, at
best, a necessary evil. It is an evil because it endangers,
even if it need not subvert, two bedrock principles of
criminal justice, the imperative that the innocent not be
convicted and the aspiration that those who are equally
culpable should be equally punished. Witnesses who
hope for leniency in compensation for testimony
against others are at least powerfully tempted to lie, and
the judicial system's mechanisms for detecting lies
motivated by such hopes are not foolproof Likewise,
the inescapable fact about sentence reductions for cooperation is that the beneficiaries of such reductions will
often receive punishments less than what society has
said they deserve for their conduct and less than what
similarly situated non-cooperators are compelled to
endure.

Unanswered Questions and Portents of
Trouble to Come
There may be some in the federal prosecutorial community who, hearing of the en banc reversals of Sealed
Case and Singleton, will heave a sigh of relief that the
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The justification for sanctioning such a potentially
corrosive practice is purely utilitarian. Bargaining for
testimony is said to be necessary to detect and successfully prosecute certain crimes. As a former prosecutor, I
accept without question the necessity of using and
rewarding cooperating witnesses ... sometimes. However, the argument from necessity does not transform a
necessary evil into a positive good. Every time the criminal justice system bargains with felons it pays a price,
the price of some increased risk of an unjust conviction
of the accused and the price of an undeserved reduction
in punishment for the guilty witness. Both common
sense and devotion to principle suggest that the system
should strive to pay this price as seldom as possible.
Underlying the Singleton panel's rebellious stand is, I
think, a rising sense of unease among the federal judiciary that substantial assistance motions are no longer
necessary rarities, but are instead the common coin of
federal criminal practice.
There is considerable empirical support for such
discomfort. The number ofS 5KI.i motions filed by federal prosecutors increased from 3.5% of all cases in
1989 to 19.5% of all cases by 1994." The number has
held steady at just under 2o% ever since.8 In some districts, the S 5Ki.i departure rate has been as high as
47.5%.'9 Moreover, Sentencing Commission statistics
unquestionably under-reportthe frequency with which
sentence reductions for cooperation are actually conferred because the Commission does not collect statistics on post-sentencing cooperation departures
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 (b).- Thus, nationwide
at least one in every five, and perhaps closer to one in
four, federal defendants receives a sentence reduction
for cooperation. When one considers the number of
defendants against whom the cooperators cooperate, it is
fair to estimate that, at a minimum, between one-third
and one-half of all federal convictions either produce a
cooperating defendant, or are in part produced by evidence from the mouth of such a defendant.
Sealed Case and the Maxfield-Kramer Report:
The Fear That Snitches Will Not Get Their Just Reward
The original Sealed Case opinion is a curious counterpoint to Singleton. While the Singleton panel may well
have been disconcerted by the corrosive effect of too
many government substantial assistance motions, the
concern of Sealed Case is that prosecutors may behave
inconsistently, and therefore inequitably, by not making
enough. Had Sealed Case withstood en banc review, the
practical effect would have been to make sentence
reductions for cooperation more common rather than
less. The claim that inconsistent government substantial assistance practice promotes unjustifiable sentencing disparities has been a consistent theme of the
defense bar for years. The Sentencing Commission
staff made its first contribution to debate on the point

FEDERAL SENTENCING

in January 1998 by issuing a report authored by Linda
Maxfield and John Kramer tiled "SubstantialAssistance:
An EmpiricalYardstick GaugingEquity in CurrentFederal
Policy and Practice."
As it happens, the conclusions of MaxfieldKramer are something of a wash for the disputants in
the debate over whether substantial assistance generates unfair sentencing disparity. On the one hand, the
report gives little support to exponents of the so-called
.cooperation paradox," the claim that substantial assistance motions routinely provide large sentencing
breaks for "drug kingpins" and other knowledgeable
higher-ups, while they are rarely offered to assertedly
ignorant lower-ranking criminals, thus producing low
sentences for bosses and higher sentences for mopes.22
The report concludes that, "The oft-cited 'truth' that
drug conspiracy members at the top of the organization
are more likely to secure reduced sentences due to substantial assistance than those lower in the criminal
organization is not supported by these exploratory
data."', On the other hand, Maxfield- Kramer concludes
that there are wide regional and inter-district disparities
in substantial assistance departure rates and practices,24
as well as statistically significant disparities between
the substantial assistance rates for Latinos and whites,
and between the rates for men and women. 5
A detailed dissection of the findings and methods
of the Maxfield- Kramer report is beyond the scope of
this essay. The point on which I want to focus attention
here is not the report's findings, but its focus. The project that ultimately became the Maxfield-Kramer report
began in 1994 as a broad-gauged, multi-faceted study of
substantial assistance practice. In its original 1995 draft
form it was tiled simply "Substantial Assistance Departures in the United States Courts." (I was Special Counsel to the Sentencing Commission in 1995-96 and was
involved in critiquing this draft.) The final i997 staff
report, of which Maxfield-Kramer is actually only an
interpretive summary, bore the equally neutral title,
"Federal Court Practices: Sentence Reductions Based
on Defendant's Substantial Assistance to the Government." Only in the hands of Ms. Maxfield and Mr.
Kramer did a report born of a general examination of
substantial assistance practice finally metamorphose
into a study about sentencing equity.
A moment's reflection will reveal that the study's
final metamorphosis is really quite odd. Section 5K.I
differs in a crucial respect from virtually every other
guideline. It was designed, not to ensure that criminals
are punished for what they truly did or to achieve sentencing equity among similarly situated offenders, but as
a tool to fight crime. As noted above, its consciously utilitarian justification is that society is willing to pay the
price of giving sentence reductions to morally undeserving cooperators in exchange for the benefit of an
increased likelihood of apprehending and convicting
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be taken to restrict this form of prosecutorial power. If
the Department of Justice is to preserve the substantial
assistance regime in substantially its present form, with
all the advantages that regime confers on dedicated
prosecutors, it must begin to respond on three fronts.

criminals who might not otherwise be caught. The problem with the Maxfield- Kramer report is that it focuses
almost exclusively on one side of society's bargain. It asks
only whether the rewards society is willing to confer for
cooperation are being distributed equitably among the
criminal classes. It does not even attempt to answer the
6
question of what society is getting in return.
Why did the Maxfield-Kramer report turn out as it
did? Several factors at least seem clear. The first is the
lamppost factor. Commission staff focused on sentencing equity for the same reason that the man who lost
his keys on a dark night looked for them under the
lamppost where the light was brightest - they had data
on the equitable effects of substantial assistance
motions, but had no useful data on the other side of the
equation, the value of the cooperation obtained.
In an article several months ago in FSR, Dan Richman argued that the gap in the Maxfield-Kramer data
is both understandable and inevitable." Under the best
of circumstances, in any individual case, quantifying
the amount and quality of assistance is inescapably subjective. As Professor Richman argues very persuasively,
the only person with a real ability to make such judgments is the individual prosecutor who handled the
case, and even the most candid of such judgments is
always subject to dispute. What, after all, does it mean
to say that a witness was "essential" to a case? Or that
the witness's testimony "substantially" assisted the government? Must the witness have been the sole source
of proof for a statutory element of the crime? Or the
sole means of disproving an affirmative defense? Or did
the witness's testimony merely increase the odds of a
successful prosecution?
Thus, any effort to quantify the benefits of substantial assistance is bound to produce imperfect results.
The peculiar slant of the Maxfield- Kramer report, however, is the product of more than the intrinsic difficulty
of measuring the benefits of substantial assistance. The
second factor at work was an institutional bias at the
Sentencing Commission in favor of sentencing equity.
The prime directive of the Commission is to stamp out
disparity; effective law enforcement is not part of its
mission. The Commission staff's predisposition to
focus on disparity issues is evident throughout the
design and execution of the study.
Nonetheless, whatever the perspective of the
study's designers, the final barrier to the creation of a
report balancing the costs of substantial assistance
agreements against their benefits was an undoubted, if
perhaps understandable, reluctance of the Department
of Justice to assist the Sentencing Commission in
assessing the real benefits ofS 5KI.I. And here we come
to the crux of the matter. Read together, the Singleton
and Sealed Case panel opinions signal concern that the
Justice Department is using cooperation agreements
too often and too inconsistently, and that steps ought to
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Some Sympathetic Suggestions to
the Justice Department
First, the Department should strive to reduce the incidence of substantial assistance motions. Sentence bargaining for testimony with felons is an evil. No credible
case can be made that this evil must be endured in
20-25% of all federal cases in order to achieve acceptable levels of prosecutorial success. If, as I think, the
present rate of substantial assistance departures cannot
be justified on the ground of necessity, then the excess
over the rate necessary to secure convictions can only
be explained by postulating that federal prosecutors are
using cooperation departures for other purposes. The
two most likely such purposes are: (i) using the substantial assistance motion as a caseload management
tool, an incentive offered to achieve a plea regardless of
whether the cooperation is either "substantial" or
required; (2) using the substantial assistance motion as
a means of selectively mitigating mandatory or Guideline sentences, usually drug sentences, that government lawyers privately believe are too harsh, either
generally or in particular cases.
Although I think both of these alternative purposes
for 5 Ki.i motions are at work daily, neither is legitimate. When prosecutors use the substantial assistance
motion as a plea bargaining incentive with no genuine
relation to government evidentiary needs or the substance of the defendant's cooperation, the government
disregards the law and cheats on the implicit contract
supporting the Guidelines themselves.
Likewise, ifS 5KI.I is routinely, but selectively, used
as a sub rosa method of mitigating the severity of sentences DOJ lawyers feel to be unjustly severe, then the
Department is also failing in its duty. If the law consistently produces punishments that require mitigation
through extra-legal means, the duty of the Justice
Department is to forthrightly advocate changes in the
law. If the Department does not do so, it acts the coward by failing to say officially what its lawyers believe
privately. And it consents to injustice in those cases
where defendants receive unduly long sentences but
are not awarded substantial assistance reductions
because their particular prosecutors refuse to bend the
rules. If, on the other hand, the Justice Department
truly believes that the sentences set by Congress and
the Commission for most offenses, including drug
offenses, are appropriate, then handing out 5 5Ki.i
motions to one-quarter of all defendants is cheating the
public of justice every time a motion is made in a case
where it is not required to obtain a conviction.
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I hasten to add that I am deeply sympathetic to the
impetus all prosecutors feel at one time or another to
use grants of discretion such as that in S5KI.I to shape
sentencing outcomes in accordance with their personal
sense of justice, even in cases where the defendant has
provided no real help to the government. The difficulty
is that this use of SKi.I is plainly extra-legal, and its
persistent occurrence lends considerable credence to
the critique that the government wants everyone else to
be constrained by rules, while insisting that prosecutors
should be free to pursue whatever results seem best to
them. Neither Congress, nor the defense bar, nor the
judiciary, nor the Sentencing Commission can be
expected to tolerate so one-sided an arrangement.
Second, the Department must make some effort to
even out the more marked regional and interdistrict disparities in substantial assistance motion rates. When
some districts give S5KI.i motions more than 40% of
the time, and the rates of other districts are consistently
in the single digits, this is not evidence of understandable regional variation, but is instead a clear sign of policy disarray. More importantly, the existence of such
stark differences gives ammunition to critics which
even modest efforts to rein in those districts at the
extremes would do much to disarm.
Finally, the Justice Department must be more
receptive to efforts to ascertain the true societal value of
the substantial assistance mechanism. Again, sentence
rewards for cooperating criminals are a necessary evil, a
price we choose to pay for greater goods. If it was only
the Justice Department that paid the price, then its
judgment about how much to pay, and to whom, and
how often would be its own private business. At present, the Department treats the issue very much in this
proprietary way. However, the price of bargaining with
felons is paid by all of us. Therefore, as the public's
agent, the Department of Justice has a responsibility to
justify its "cooperation expenditure" in the same way it
and all other public agencies have a responsibility to
justify the expenditure of public money. The question
that the Justice Department has so far failed to
answer- and I suspect has not even asked itself- is:
What are we buying for all these sentence reductions?
Are we getting more convictions? Better convictions?
Faster convictions?
Statistics are often uncertain guides, and any
inquiry in this area would have to be undertaken with
the greatest caution against over-interpreting its results.
Still, some questions can certainly be answered if pursued in the right way. If the Department of Justice is to
arm itself for the growing policy debate over substantial
assistance, a debate in which Singleton and Sealed Case
were merely incidents, it should study its own practices
and be open to studies of them by legitimately interested outside parties. At the end of the day, the Justice
Department bears the burden of proving that in sub-
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stantial assistance motions, as elsewhere, its practices
are both just and in the public interest.
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they wrote: "Expected factors (e.g., type of cooperation,
benefit of cooperation, defendant culpability or function, relevant conduct, offense type) generally were found inadequate in
explaining §5K]. 1 departures." Id., at 21 (emphasis added).
The plain implication of this sentence is that Commission
staff gathered meaningful data on the benefits of substantial
assistance and included that data as part of the regression
analysis that produced results suggesting racial inequities.
The problem is that the study's conclusions about race and
gender are based on a multiple regression analysis of all
38,498 cases sentenced in FY 1994, including all 7,524
cases with substantial assistance departures. There is no
method of which I am aware that would allow combining the
results of a multiple regression analysis of 38,000 cases, or
of 7,524 substantial assistance cases, with the results of a
phone survey of an unrepresentative subset of 130 substantial assistance cases to produce any coherent conclusion.
Daniel C. Richman, The Challenges of Investigating §5K1.1 In
Practice, 11 FED. SENT. R. 75 ( Sept.-Oct. 1998).

Id. at 20.
Latinos are apparently less likely to receive a substantial
assistance motion than whites, while women are more likely
to receive such motions than men. Id. at 13-14.
26 The only information collected by the Commission's §5K1.1
study on the benefits conferred by substantial assistance
came from a phone survey of Assistant U.S. Attorneys which
produced information about 130 drug defendants who
received substantial assistance motions in FY 1994 (1.7% of
the 7,524 defendants who received substantial assistance
departures in FY 1994). Id. at 29. Unsurprisingly the
Maxfield-Kramer report does not attempt to draw any general conclusions about the overall benefits of substantial
assistance from so tiny and unrepresentative a sample.
However, Maxfield and Kramer do imply that the skimpy
benefits data bolsters their conclusions about sentencing
equity. After concluding that the study reveals statistically
significant evidence of inequities in substantial assistance
practice based on legally impermissible factors like race,
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